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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL AT-
TITUDE TowARD ENFORCEMENT-The "numbers game" is today the 
most profitable of the wide-spread gambling rackets. And like all 
organized gambling it is a focal source and the financial support of 
far more serious crimes.1 At the same time it is one of the most 
difficult forms of crime for the police to control. It needs no costly 
installations which the police can confiscate or destroy. Unlike 
"house" gambling it cannot practically be harassed out of business. 
It can be operated by one man alone, if he survives failure to pay 
off for lack of capital; or by a syndicate with capital enough to hire 
runners. All that such operators need is some sort of headquarters 
to which pick-up men can report and where the bookkeeping can 
be carried on. This headquarters may be someone's private house, 
or merely a rented room. In consequence, the only possibility of 
holding such gambling in check is through discovery and punish-
ment of its pick-up runners, or fortuitous convictions of the more 
important operators. And even this latter has been made almost 
impossible as a practical matter by judge-made limitations on police 
invasion of a criminal's privacy.2 
This simplicity with which the particular type of racket can be 
operated and the conditions which naturally make its control 
peculiarly difficult give striking color and consequence to the 
judicial attitude toward effective crime prevention revealed in a 
recent Michigan decision.3 
State police had been twice tipped-off that a certain man was 
picking up gambling bets, a misdemeanor punishable by imprison-
ment for up to one year.4 Acting on the second tip, officers in a 
cruiser were watching defendant's car, when it ran the stop sign at 
1 Consider, for example, the discoveries by Senator Kefauver's wide investigation. 
2E.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 
434, 282 P. (2d) 905 (1955); McKnight v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 977; 
Gorman v. State, 161 Md. 700, 158 A. 903 (1931). 
3 People v. Zeigler, (Mich. 1960) 100 N.W. (2d) 456. 
4 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§750.301, 750.304, 750.306. 
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an intersection. They arrested the driver, Donald Zeigler, for the 
traffic violation. Asked if he had any contraband, Zeigler said, "No, 
go ahead and search the car." Search was made and nothing found. 
Asked if he had any contraband on his person, he reached into an 
overcoat pocket and pulled out several gambling cards. One 
officer asked if he might search the defendant and without 
waiting for permission reached into a coat pocket and took out a 
memorandum book of bets. The defendant "was reluctant to let 
it go and made a motion to pull it back." At his trial on a charge 
of possessing pool books and other wagering memoranda both the 
gambling cards and memorandum book were offered in evidence. 
Defendant's motion to suppress was denied. On appeal, the 
supreme court, Smith, J., vigorously dissenting, reversed convic-
tion and set Zeigler free. 
There is ample, though questionable, authority in Mich-
igan for holding that facts learned by what particular judges choose 
to call unlawful search may be suppressed and concealed from 
juries sworn to determine the truth.5 But before the court in the 
Zeigler case could order the proof of his guilt suppressed it had to 
decide that the search by which the proof came to light was un-
lawful. And here the particular judges concerned were free to 
decide as they chose. "The test of reasonableness cannot be stated 
in rigid and absolute terms."6 "What is a reasonable search is 
not to be determined by any fixed formula ... and, regrettably, in 
our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring 
questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in 
the facts and circumstances of each case. "7 
Just why the court chose to call the search in this case un-
reasonable is not apparent from the decision. No constitutional 
provision, no statute, no established rule of law, indeed no sound 
precedent compelled it. The judges were wholly free to char-
acterize it as lawful and proper if they so chose. That the majority 
saw fit, instead, to call it unlawful must have been a matter of per-
sonal predilection, indicating their attitudes toward effective law 
enforcement. 
The arrest of the defendant was lawful the entire court agreed. 
The primary issue, therefore, was simply whether or not the search 
of his person following a valid arrest was itself invalid. On this 
5 See Waite, "Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons," 31 MICH. L. REv. 749 (1933). 
6 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 at 150 (1947). 
7 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 at 63 (1950). 
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point the court might have cited, but did not, Judge Cardozo's 
opinion in People v. Chiagales. There, as in the Zeigler case, 
incriminating material, letters, had been taken from the defendant 
following his arrest. In holding the search to have been proper 
that court said: "Search of the person becomes lawful when grounds 
for arrest and accusation have been discovered, and the law is in 
the act of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical domin-
ion .... The defendant does not attack the legality of the arrest .... 
Conceding the legality of the arrest, he concedes by implication the 
legality of the search."8 
Michigan decisions are replete with the general statement that 
"the police have the power and it is also their duty to search the 
person of one lawfully arrested ... for articles that may be used 
in evidence to prove the charge on which he is arrested."9 
Whether the limitation of the last six words is intentional or merely 
casual does not appear, because in each case the search was for only 
such matters and the right to search for other things was not in-
volved. On the other hand, broader dicta without the limitation 
are commonplace in other states to the effect that "[t]he guaranty 
of the constitution is not against all search and seizure ... and does 
not extend to immunity from search on arrest."10 But again these 
statements are only dicta on the points involved because search for 
things not connected with the crime for which arrest was made 
was not involved. Thus again the propriety of the Zeigler search 
is not settled by precedent, is left to judicial preference. 
The majority preferred to hold it unlawful, relying upon a 
dictum in People v. Gonzales,11 one of the court's own decisions of 
a year earlier. In this case the police had stopped a car for having 
only one headlight burning. In "checking" the interior they found 
a partially concealed pistol the ownership of which Gonzales ad-
mitted. When charged with the felony of carrying a concealed 
weapon he alleged that search of the car was unlawful and evidence 
of the gun should be suppressed. Suppression was ordered by the 
trial court and the state appealed. However, the people of Michi-
gan had previously become sufficiently incensed by judicial sup-
pression of evidence and release of law breakers in concealed 
8 237 N.Y. 193 at 197, 142 N.E. 583 (1923). 
9 People v. Harris, 300 Mich. 463, 2 N.W. (2d) 464 (1942), quoting People v. Cona, 
180 Mich. 641 at 652 (1914), quoting Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22 at 24, 93 N.Y.S. 202 
(1905). 
10 E.g., People v. Hord, 329 Ill. 117 at 119, 160 N.E. 135 (1928). 
11355 Mich. 247, 97 N.W. (2d) 16 (1959). 
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weapons cases-and again later in narcotic peddling cases-to put 
into the state constitution a specific provision that pistols and other 
weapons seized by the police outside the curtilage should not be 
excluded from evidence.12 The trial court's suppression of the 
evidence was reversed on this ground. Properly speaking, there 
was no issue of lawfulness of search before the court and no finding 
concerning it was relevant. 
In his opinion, however, Justice Edwards did enter upon a 
discussion of what would constitute a lawful search. Without 
broad examination of the question generally, he bluntly repu-
diated, on the ground that its cited authorities did not sustain it, 
the holding in a still earlier case that: "The arrest here was lawful, 
and that it therefore was proper for the officers to search the person 
of the defendant and the vehicle in which he was then riding is 
settled by the following authorities, from which we need not 
quote."13 Justice Edwards' dictum then set up the proposition 
that even after lawful arrest search must be limited to looking for 
fruits of the crime, or the means by which it was committed, or 
instruments calculated to effect escape from custody. He was not 
voicing a decision relevant to the case itself; conceivably he was 
deliberately setting up a bit of judicial legislation for guidance of 
the court in the future. 
At any rate, the search in the Zeigler case had no purpose con-
nected with the offense of running the stop sign, and the majority, 
relying only on the tenuous authority of that earlier dictum, held it 
"unreasonable" and the evidence obtained unusable. 
The dissenting opinion contends that the search was lawful, as 
well as for other reasons because "based on probable cause to be-
lieve that a crime has been or is being committed and that evidence 
thereof is to be found." The majority met this only with a flat 
statement that "anonymous information does not meet the test."14 
Justice Smith's vigorous reply was: "Rarely has the betrayal of 
justice by the easy seduction of words been more apparent than in 
this case. Here the word that solves everything for our majority is 
the word 'anonymous.' ... If the information reaching the officer 
of the commission of a crime is definite, certain, and apparently 
trustworthy, the officer acts upon probable cause even though the 
12 MICH. CONST., Art. II, §10, as amended in 1936 and 1952. 
13 People v. Davis, 247 Mich. 536, 226 N.W. 337 (1929). 
14 Relying on People v. Miller, 245 Mich. 115, 222 N.W. 151 (1928) and People v. 
Guertins, 224 Mich. 8, 194 N.W. 561 (1923). 
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informant refuses to state his name, is silenced before his name is 
disclosed, recites a fictitious name, or, indeed, gives his name as 
Smith or Jones .... Here the information was apparently authen-
tic, reliable, and precise. . . . It cannot be the law that officers, 
given certain facts apparently reliable and trustworthy, may remain 
quiescent in the station house if their informant refuses to disclose 
his name, but must be galvanized into immediate action if the 
informant adds that his name is John Doe."15 
The merits of these various points of view as to the legality of 
the search, or, indeed, their judicial wisdom cannot be settled on 
a basis of strict law, nor even of obligatory precedent. "The con-
stitutional expression 'unreasonable searches' is not fixed and ab-
solute in meaning. The meaning in some degree must change with 
changing social, economic, and legal conditions."16 In the princi-
pal case the majority obviously labored to produce the result which 
they wished, apparently indifferent to its social consequences. The 
dissent was forthright and credibly accurate, "If a police officer 
cannot arrest and search [ under such conditions] then we indeed 
make this State a happy hunting ground for those evilly disposed."17 
The effects of the decision developed almost immediately. 
Within less than three weeks police officers stopped a car for a 
traffic violation. In the car they found $2,700 in cash, 150 cartons 
of cigarettes and 300,000 trading stamps recently stolen from a 
local market. At the preliminary hearing the magistrate "felt com-
pelled" by the Zeigler decision to reject the evidence.18 At a re-
hearing he bound defendants over for trial on the strength of other 
evidence. In further proceedings, however, the circuit court held 
the evidence admissible, on the ground that the circumstances 
surrounding the incident indicated the vehicle was not stopped 
solely for a traffic violation but because the automobile "gave 
grounds for suspicion." The court also stated that "there was no 
search of the automobile other than observation," and that prior 
decisions did not bar the evidence so obtained.19 
Though effective control of numbers gambling, and indeed of 
all crime, is "stuck" with the Zeigler decision, there is, happily, no 
sound reason why later judges or even these same judges need to 
15100 N.W. (2d) 456 at 464-465 (1960). 
16 Milam v. United States, (4th Cir. 1924) 296 F. 629. See also comment, 42 MICH. L. 
REv. 147 (1943). 
17100 N.W. (2d) 456 at 463-464 (1960). 
18 ANN ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 19, 1960. 
19 ANN AruloR NEWS, June 18, 1960. 
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stick by it. "I see no reason," said the Supreme Court's Justice 
Jackson, "why I should be consciously wrong today because I was 
unconsciously wrong yesterday."20 
John B. Waite, 
Professor Emeritus of Law, 
University of Michigan 
20 Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 at 640 (1948). See also Special Equip-
ment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 at 383-384 (1945): "This Court was responsible for their 
creation. This Court should take the responsibility for their removal." West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943). 
